

MINUTES
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
January 4, 2022

The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) met by videoconference on January 4, 2022. The following members were in attendance:

Judge John D. Bates, Chair
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Esq.
Judge Jesse M. Furman
Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Esq.
Judge Frank Mays Hull
Judge William J. Kayatta, Jr.
Peter D. Keisler, Esq.

Judge Carolyn B. Kuhl
Professor Troy A. McKenzie
Judge Patricia A. Millett
Hon. Lisa O. Monaco, Esq.*
Judge Gene E.K. Pratter
Kosta Stojilkovic, Esq.
Judge Jennifer G. Zipps

Professor Catherine T. Struve attended as reporter to the Standing Committee.

The following attended on behalf of the Advisory Committees:

Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules –
Judge Jay S. Bybee, Chair
Professor Edward Hartnett, Reporter

Advisory Committee on Civil Rules –
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., Chair
Professor Edward H. Cooper, Reporter
Professor Richard L. Marcus,
Associate Reporter

Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules –
Judge Dennis R. Dow, Chair
Professor S. Elizabeth Gibson, Reporter
Professor Laura B. Bartell,
Associate Reporter

Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules –
Judge Patrick J. Schiltz, Chair
Professor Daniel J. Capra, Reporter

Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules –
Judge Raymond M. Kethledge, Chair
Professor Sara Sun Beale, Reporter
Professor Nancy J. King,
Associate Reporter

Others providing support to the Standing Committee included: Professors Daniel R. Coquillette, Bryan A. Garner, and Joseph Kimble, consultants to the Standing Committee; Bridget Healy, Rules Committee Staff Acting Chief Counsel; Julie Wilson and Scott Myers, Rules Committee Staff Counsel; Brittany Bunting and Shelly Cox, Rules Committee Staff; Burton S. DeWitt, Law Clerk to the Standing Committee; Judge John S. Cooke, Director of the Federal

* Prior to the lunch break, Elizabeth J. Shapiro, Deputy Director, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, represented the Department of Justice (DOJ) on behalf of Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco. Deputy Attorney General Monaco represented DOJ after the lunch break. Andrew Goldsmith was also present on behalf of the DOJ.

Judicial Center (FJC); Emery G. Lee, Senior Research Associate at the FJC; and Dr. Tim Reagan, Senior Research Associate at the FJC.

OPENING BUSINESS

Judge Bates called the virtual meeting to order and welcomed everyone. He welcomed new Standing Committee members Elizabeth Cabraser and Professor Troy McKenzie. He also noted that Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco would attend the afternoon session of the meeting and thanked the other Department of Justice (DOJ) representatives for joining. In addition, Judge Bates thanked the members of the public who were in attendance for their interest in the rulemaking process.

Judge Bates next acknowledged Julie Wilson, who would be leaving the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) at the end of January. Judge Bates thanked Ms. Wilson for her years of tremendous service to the rules committees. Professor Struve seconded Judge Bates's sentiments on behalf of the reporters. The reporters and Advisory Committee Chairs expanded on these thanks at later points during the meeting.

Upon motion by a member, seconded by another, and on a voice vote: **The Standing Committee unanimously approved the minutes of the June 22, 2021 meeting.**

Bridget Healy reviewed the status of proposed rules and forms amendments currently proceeding through each stage of the Rules Enabling Act (REA) process and referred members to the tracking chart beginning on page 56 of the agenda book. The chart lists rule amendments that went into effect on December 1, 2021. It sets out proposed amendments and proposed new rules that were recently approved by the Judicial Conference. Those proposed amendments and new rules were transmitted to the Supreme Court and will go into effect on December 1, 2022, provided they are adopted by the Supreme Court and Congress takes no action to the contrary. The chart also includes proposed amendments and new rules that are at earlier stages of the REA process.

Judge Bates noted that some public comments had been received on proposed emergency rules developed in response to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), and that he expected more comments to be received by the close of the public comment period in February. These comments will be reviewed and discussed by the relevant Advisory Committees at their spring meetings.

JOINT COMMITTEE BUSINESS

Electronic Filing by Self-Represented Litigants

Judge Bates introduced this agenda item, which concerns the Advisory Committees' consideration of several suggestions regarding electronic filing by "pro se" (or self-represented) litigants. Noting that he had asked Professor Struve to convene the committee reporters in order to

coordinate their consideration of those suggestions, he invited Professor Struve to provide an update on those discussions.

Professor Struve thanked the commenters whose suggestions had brought this item back onto the rules committees' docket. She stated that at the group's first virtual meeting (in December 2021), the Advisory Committee reporters and researchers from the FJC had discussed how to formulate a research agenda on this topic. The goal is to share ideas on research questions, even though the four Advisory Committees in question may not necessarily reach identical views or formulate identical proposals for rule amendments.

Judge Bates highlighted the fact that the FJC researchers were being asked to devote time to this project and asked the Standing Committee if any members had any comments or concerns with utilizing the FJC's assistance. No members expressed any concern. Judge Bates also thanked Judge Kuhl for a thoughtful suggestion concerning terminology. Judge Kuhl reported that the state courts see a very high number of self-represented litigants, and that the courts are trying to phase out the use of Latin phrases (such as "pro se") that can be harder for lay people to understand. Judge Bates observed that the Advisory Committee chairs and reporters would take this point into account.

Juneteenth National Independence Day

Judge Bates introduced this agenda item, which concerns the proposal to amend the rules' definition of "legal holiday" to explicitly list Juneteenth National Independence Day. He noted that three of the four relevant Advisory Committees had already approved proposed amendments to add the new holiday to the list of legal holidays in their respective time-computation rules, and that the fourth Advisory Committee expects to do so at its spring 2022 meeting. Those proposals will come to the Standing Committee for consideration at its June 2022 meeting and will likely constitute technical amendments that can be forwarded for final approval without publication and comment.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES

Judge Bybee and Professor Hartnett provided the report of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, which met via videoconference on October 7, 2021. The Advisory Committee presented an action item along with multiple information items. The Advisory Committee's report and the draft minutes of its last meeting were included in the agenda book beginning at page 100.

Action Item

Publication of Proposed Amendment to Rules 35 and 40, and Conforming Amendments to Rule 32 and the Appendix of Length Limits. In this action item, the Advisory Committee sought approval for publication of a package of proposed amendments that would consolidate the contents of Rule 35 into Rule 40 and that would make conforming changes to Rule 32 and to the Appendix of Length Limits. Judge Bybee explained that the Advisory Committee had been considering comprehensive amendments to Rules 35 and 40 for some time. Rule 35 addresses hearings and rehearings en banc, and Rule 40 addresses panel rehearings. The proposed amendments would

transfer to Rule 40 the contents of Rule 35 so that the provisions regarding panel rehearing and en banc hearing or rehearing could be found in a single rule, Rule 40. Judge Bybee stated that as a result of discussion at the last Standing Committee meeting, the Advisory Committee acted with a freer hand to revise Rule 40 to clarify and simplify the rule. The result is a more linear rule that was unanimously approved by the Advisory Committee. Judge Bybee thanked the style consultants for their work on the proposed amended rule.

Judge Bates asked about the order of the subparts in Rule 40(b)(2). When listing potential reasons for rehearing en banc, would it not make more sense to list, first, instances when the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court, and then, instances when the decision creates a conflict within the circuit, and finally, instances when the decision creates a conflict with another court? Judge Bybee stated that the Advisory Committee considered the order when drafting the rule. The main reason behind the proposed structure is that an initial consideration for a court of appeals is to maintain consistency within its own docket. Hence, the Advisory Committee chose to list intra-circuit inconsistencies first (in 40(b)(2)(A)). Professor Hartnett agreed with Judge Bybee and added that subparagraph 40(b)(2)(A) is different because it addresses a situation that does not provide grounds for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.

Judge Bates turned the discussion to proposed amended Rule 40(d)(1), which sets the presumptive deadline for filing a rehearing petition but provides for the alteration of that deadline “by order or local rule.” He asked whether any circuits have local rules that alter that deadline and he questioned whether such local rulemaking was desirable. Professor Hartnett stated that this feature was carried over from current Rules 35(c) and 40(a)(1). A judge member noted that the 14-day limit to file a petition for rehearing is short, particularly for pro se prisoner litigants. In her circuit, there is a local rule that sets the limit at 21 days. This member recommended against precluding circuits from affording litigants a longer period by local rule.

A practitioner member asked whether the proposed Rule 40(g) should say “[t]he provisions of Rule 40(b)(2)(D) . . .” instead of just “[t]he provisions of Rule 40(b)(2).” As written, Rule 40(b)(2)(A)-(C) all refer to “the panel decision,” which would be inapplicable in a petition for initial hearing en banc. Judge Bybee agreed that the wording of Rule 40(b)(2)(A) would not apply literally to a request for initial hearing en banc, but the intent of the Advisory Committee was to allow for an initial hearing en banc when there is an intra-circuit inconsistency. Judge Bybee noted that in his circuit, initial hearings en banc sometimes occur sua sponte when a panel notices two inconsistent opinions of the circuit and refers the inconsistency to the en banc court. The practitioner member agreed that it makes sense to be inclusive if there is a concern about intra-circuit conflict.

The practitioner member asked about Rule 40(b)(2)(C)’s use of the phrase “authoritative decision” when discussing a panel decision’s conflict with a decision from another circuit. This phrase is not used elsewhere in the rule. Judge Bybee responded that this phrasing would rule out rehearing requests based on conflicts with unpublished decisions from other circuits. Professor Hartnett agreed that this provision was designed to exclude petitions asserting conflicts merely with unpublished (i.e., nonprecedential) opinions from other circuits. In response to a follow-up question, Judge Bybee acknowledged that the omission of “authoritative” from Rule 40(b)(2)(A) means that that provision can extend to intra-circuit splits involving unpublished decisions.

The same practitioner member pointed out that Rule 40(d)(5) bars oral argument on whether to grant a rehearing petition and asked whether this prohibition should be revised to allow for local rules or orders to the contrary. In his recent experience, a circuit had ordered argument on whether to grant a petition for rehearing – and subsequently issued a decision that both granted the petition for rehearing and reached a different outcome on the merits. Such a process can be useful, this member said, so why remove this flexibility? Judge Bybee explained that the rule is drafted to discourage requests for argument on whether to grant rehearing. Professor Hartnett added that, under Rule 2, the court has authority to suspend the prohibition on oral arguments by order in a case. Based on these responses, the practitioner member stated that he did not see a need to revise proposed Rule 40(d)(5).

A judge member asked a pair of drafting questions. First, he asked why the proposed new title for Rule 40 (“Rehearing; En Banc Determination”) used the word “determination.” Professor Hartnett explained that “en banc determination” was selected to encompass an initial hearing en banc, which would not be a “rehearing.” Second, the judge member noted that the timing provision in current Rule 35(c) says “must be filed” but the timing provision in current Rule 40(a)(1) says “may be filed.” He asked why proposed Rule 40(d)(1) used “may be filed” (on lines 105 and 112 of the draft at page 128 of the agenda book). Professor Hartnett responded that one possible reason was to avoid the use of a word (“must”) that might lead lay readers to think that the rule was requiring the filing of a rehearing petition. A judge member agreed that pro se litigants might misread “must” as a requirement that they file a petition for a rehearing even if they do not desire a rehearing, while “may” clarifies that they can file a petition, and if they do so, they must do so within fourteen days. The Standing Committee, along with Judge Bybee, Professor Hartnett, and the style consultants, discussed the competing virtues of “may” and “must,” as well as a suggestion from the style consultants to change to “any petition ... must” (at lines 103-05) rather than “a petition ... must.” As a result of the discussion, Judge Bybee and Professor Hartnett agreed to change “a” to “any” in line 103 and “may” to “must” in line 105. As to the use of “may” in line 112, further discussion noted that keeping this as “may” would parallel the use of “must” and “may” in, respectively, Rules 4(a)(1)(A) and 4(a)(1)(B). Ultimately the decision was made to retain “may” at line 112.

A practitioner member suggested that the wording of proposed Rule 40(c) seemed (in comparison to the current rule) to liberalize the standard for granting rehearing en banc. New Rule 40(c) says it “[o]rdinarily ... will be ordered only if” a specified condition is met, whereas current Rule 35(a) says that it “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless” a specified condition is met. Saying “will not be ordered unless” would help emphasize that en banc rehearing is not preferred. Relatedly, the same member noted that the phrase “rehearing en banc is not favored” had been moved to proposed Rule 40(a), and he suggested that phrase should appear in Rule 40(c). Professor Hartnett stated that the first of the member’s points was a style issue on which the Advisory Committee had deferred to the style consultants. As to the second point, Professor Hartnett explained that the Advisory Committee had moved “rehearing en banc is not favored” up to Rule 40(a) for emphasis. He recalled that an earlier draft may have featured that phrase in both Rule 40(a) and Rule 40(c), and he suggested that the Advisory Committee would prefer to include the phrase in both subparts (even if redundant) rather than simply moving it to Rule 40(c). Judge Bybee agreed with Professor Hartnett but noted he had no objection to including

“rehearing en banc is not favored” in both Rule 40(a) and Rule 40(c). A judge member who had participated in the Advisory Committee discussions voiced support for including the phrase in both places. In response to the practitioner member’s first point, Professor Garner suggested changing “ordered” to “allowed” in line 98 (“[o]rdinarily ... will be allowed only if”). Such a change would recognize that the court has discretion, but is not required, to order an en banc rehearing if one of the four criteria is met.

A judge member thanked the Advisory Committee and thought the proposed amended rule is more user friendly and clearer. She suggested that reinserting the word “panel” in the title would clarify the rule, particularly for self-represented litigants. Professor Hartnett and Judge Bybee agreed with the suggestion to add “panel” back into the title. Judge Bates voiced his support for adding the word “panel” back into the title as well; he observed that might assist users of the table of contents.

A judge member, stating that adverbs are over-used, questioned the use of “ordinarily” in the phrase about when rehearing en banc will be ordered; this member expressed a preference for “may be allowed.” A different judge member disagreed and thought the word “ordinarily” should be retained. In rare cases the court may want to grant rehearing en banc even though none of the stated criteria are met. A practitioner member concurred in the latter view and said that “ordinarily” usefully preserves the court’s discretion both in Rule 40(c) and in proposed Rule 40(d)(4), which provides that the court “ordinarily” will not grant rehearing without ordering a response to the petition. Judge Bates agreed that “ordinarily” should be retained.

After further discussion, Judge Bybee requested approval for publication of the proposed transfer of Rule 35’s contents to Rule 40, the proposed amendments to Rule 40, and the proposed conforming amendments to Rule 32 and the Appendix of Length Limits. The rule amendments being voted on would include the following changes to Rule 40 compared with the version shown at pages 122-132 in the agenda book: (1) insertion of “Panel” in the title; (2) correction of typographical errors on lines 77, 85, and 86; (3) on lines 97-98, replacing “Ordinarily, rehearing en banc will be ordered” with “Rehearing en banc is not favored and ordinarily will be allowed;” (4) on line 103, changing “a” to “any,” and (5) on line 105, changing “may” to “must”

Upon motion by a member, seconded by another, and on a voice vote: **The Standing Committee unanimously approved for publication for public comment the proposed amendments to Rules 35 and 40, with the changes as noted above, and conforming amendments to Rule 32 and the Appendix of Length Limits.**

Information Items

Amicus Disclosures. Judge Bybee invited Professor Hartnett to introduce the information item concerning potential amendments to Rule 29’s disclosure requirements. Professor Hartnett underscored the Advisory Committee’s interest in obtaining the Standing Committee’s feedback on this topic. The Advisory Committee began a review of Rule 29 in 2019 following the introduction in both houses of Congress of the Assessing Monetary Influence in the Courts of the United States Act (AMICUS Act). In 2021, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and Representative

Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr. requested that the Advisory Committee review Rule 29’s disclosure requirements for organizations that file amicus briefs.

Professor Hartnett explained that the question of amicus disclosures involves important and complicated issues. One issue is that insufficient amicus disclosure requirements can enable parties to evade the page limits on briefs or permit an amicus to file a brief that appears independent of the parties but is not. Another issue is that, without sufficient disclosures, one person or a small number of people with deep pockets can fund multiple amicus briefs and give the misleading impression of a broad consensus. Countervailing concerns include First Amendment rights of persons who do not wish to reveal their identity.

Professor Hartnett stated that there are many approaches the Advisory Committee could take in amending Rule 29, depending on how these various issues are resolved. One approach is that the Advisory Committee could move forward with minimal amendments such as adding “drafting” to the current rule’s disclosure requirement concerning persons that “contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief” – to foreclose the contention that this disclosure requirement only reaches funding for the costs of printing and filing a brief.

He advised that a more extensive revision to Rule 29 is possible, and he noted three issues that the Advisory Committee is reviewing. First, Rule 29 could be amended to address contributions beyond funds earmarked for a particular brief. However, if the Advisory Committee goes down this road, it raises the question of the contribution threshold that would trigger disclosure requirements. The sketch of a potential rule on page 106 of the agenda book would trigger disclosure if a party (or its counsel) contributed at least 10 percent of the amicus’s gross annual revenue. That 10 percent trigger is borrowed from Rule 26.1, which deals with corporate disclosures. The purposes of the two rules are different, but the 10 percent number provides a starting point for the discussion.

Professor Hartnett noted that a second issue is whether any increased disclosure requirements should apply only to relationships between the parties and an amicus, or whether such increased requirements should also encompass disclosures relating to the relationship between non-parties and an amicus. Finally, he stated that the Advisory Committee is also looking at the issue of whether to retain the current rule’s exemption from disclosure for nonparty members of an amicus. An exclusion avoids some of the constitutional issues regarding membership lists, but if any disclosure requirement excludes members, it would make it easy to avoid disclosure by converting contributions into membership fees.

Judge Bates noted that this is a particularly important and sensitive subject, and specifically so because it comes through the Supreme Court to the Advisory Committee. Judge Bates asked if members had any comments or suggestions.

A practitioner member stated that the three issues Professor Hartnett noted are important to consider, and the Advisory Committee should try to find middle ground. A broader amendment, particularly with respect to disclosure regarding non-parties, may not be successful.

A judge member believed the Advisory Committee was asking the right questions and was right on point with its conclusions. Another judge member agreed that the Advisory Committee was heading in the right direction. As a judge, he would rather know who was behind a brief, though he noted that the importance of that question does get greatly overstated. He suggested that seeking the “middle ground” might prove to be quite a challenge because actors might structure their transactions to evade the disclosure requirement.

A practitioner member thought the middle ground route would be preferable. The member also noted that there is an uptick in the motions to file amicus briefs in district courts now, particularly in multi-district litigation and other complex litigation, and the district courts have less experience in dealing with amicus filings. Judge Bates noted the absence of any national rule governing amicus filings in the district court and observed that this may be a matter for other Advisory Committees and the Standing Committee to consider in the future. A judge member suggested that it is important for the Civil Rules to address amicus filings in the district courts, particularly to deal with the possibility that an amicus might file a brief for the purpose of triggering a recusal. (Discussion of amicus filings in the district court recurred later in the meeting, during the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s presentation, as noted below.) Another judge member suggested that it would be helpful to know more about the AMICUS Act’s prospects of enactment.

A practitioner member noted that amicus filings often face a time crunch and increasing the disclosure requirements risks dissuading amici from undertaking the effort. For an organization with many members – such as a banking association – detailed disclosures could be burdensome.

A judge member suggested that one approach might be to adopt a rule that invites voluntary disclosures – that is, an amicus would either identify its principal members and funders or state that it is choosing not to disclose. This voluntary standard avoids constitutional issues while also allowing parties to disclose the information.

A judge member stated she liked the 10 percent rule. It is a significant trigger for recusal concerns, and it is already in use in the corporate disclosure requirements. Moreover, if the disclosure would require a judge to either recuse herself or to deny leave to file an amicus brief, it seems very “head-in-the-sand” to not require that disclosure.

A practitioner member stressed the importance of the distinction between parties and non-parties. As to parties, he observed that it is very easy to see the concern about a party using an amicus filing as an additional opportunity to make an argument. However, in practice there is a lot of coordination between amici and parties. Parties seek out potential amici whose voices they would like to get before the court. Though it is important to enforce the rule’s current requirements, practical experience illustrates the limits of what can be done by rulemaking. As to non-parties, it would be useful for the court to know if there is a dominant, hidden figure lurking behind an amicus. But if the rule were to go beyond that level of detail, one would have to ask what problem the rule is trying to solve. If the court has never heard of the amicus, the court can simply assess the amicus brief on its own merits.

Judge Bybee thanked the Standing Committee members for their comments and stated that he would relay them to the Advisory Committee.

Judge Bates asked for comments on the other information items outlined in the Advisory Committee's report in the agenda book. There were no further comments.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES

Judge Schiltz and Professor Capra provided the report of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, which last met in Washington, DC on November 5, 2021. The Advisory Committee's report presented multiple information items but no action items. The Advisory Committee's report and the draft minutes of its last meeting were included in the agenda book beginning at page 302.

Information Items

Rules Published for Public Comment in August 2021. Judge Schiltz reminded the Standing Committee that proposed amendments to Rules 106, 615, and 702 had been published for public comment in August 2021. The proposed amendments to Rule 702, which clarify the court's gatekeeping role for admitting expert testimony, will be controversial. The Advisory Committee has received a number of comments on that proposal and expects to hear testimony on it at its upcoming January 2022 hearing. Judge Schiltz stated that courts have frequently misconstrued Rule 702 requirements as going only to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the expert's testimony; those judges will admit the testimony if they think that a reasonable juror could conclude that the requirements are met. The proposed amendments to the rule emphasize that the court must determine that the reliability-based requirements for expert testimony are established by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the trial court must evaluate whether the expert's conclusion is properly derived from the basis and methodology that the expert has employed. The latter aspect of the proposal is designed to address the problem of overstatement by experts.

Judge Schiltz provided some detail concerning the comments received regarding Rule 702. He explained that there is some opposition, particularly from members of the plaintiffs' bar, to the concept of amending the rule. Judge Schiltz said that the Advisory Committee is unlikely to accept this point of view, because it believes that Rule 702 needs clarification. Courts frequently issue decisions interpreting Rule 702 incorrectly. Conversely, comments from the defense bar say that the Advisory Committee has not done enough to clarify the rule, and that the committee note should be more explicit that certain decisions are wrong and are rejected. The Advisory Committee does not think specifically singling out incorrect decisions in the committee note is the correct approach.

When discussing a draft of the proposed amendments, some Advisory Committee members had expressed concern that under the proposal as then formulated ("if the court finds"), some judges might think they need to make formal findings on the record that all the requirements of the rule are met, even if no party objects to the expert testimony. To address this concern, the proposed amendment as published for comment instead uses the phrase "if the proponent has demonstrated." A number of commentators have objected to this change. These comments note

that the very problem the amendment is designed to fix is that often the judge delegates this responsibility to jurors when it should be the judge who determines whether the requirements are met. According to these commentators, because this language does not say who needs to make the determination, it does not in fact provide the clarification that the amended rule is intended to convey. Judge Schiltz asked whether the Standing Committee had comments on the proposed amendments to Rule 702 for the Advisory Committee's consideration at its next meeting.

A practitioner member noted that in mass tort litigation, there are complaints among defense lawyers that courts do not sufficiently screen expert testimony, choosing instead to say that objections go to weight, not admissibility. There are limits to how much can be done to legislate this issue, so the member agrees with the Advisory Committee's decision not to specifically criticize incorrect decisions in the committee note. However, some emphasis on enhancing the judicial role, even if only in situations where the testimony's admissibility is central and contested, would not be too much of an imposition on the court.

Rule 611 – Illustrative Aids. Judge Schiltz introduced this information item as one that the Advisory Committee will likely submit to the Standing Committee in June 2022 with a request for approval to publish for public comment. He explained that illustrative aids are not specifically addressed by any rules. Judges, himself included, often struggle to distinguish demonstrative evidence (offered to prove a fact) from illustrative aids. Additionally, judges have very different rules on whether parties must disclose illustrative aids prior to use at trial, as well as whether (and how) they can go to the jury. Finally, judges have different rules on whether illustrative aids are or can be part of the record. Judge Schiltz noted that there is a companion proposal to amend Rule 1006, which deals with summaries, that is also under consideration by the Advisory Committee.

A judge member applauded the proposed changes to Rule 611 and Rule 1006. He suggested that to the extent that the proposed addition to Rule 611 (as set out on pages 304-05 of the agenda book) sets conditions for the use of an illustrative aid, it seems odd to include items (3) and (4). Those two provisions—the prohibition on providing the aid to the jury over a party's objection unless the court finds good cause; and the requirement that the aid be entered into the record—are not conditions on the use of an illustrative aid but rather regulations of what happens after the use of the illustrative aid. Professor Capra agreed with the judge member that items (3) and (4) should be part of a separate subdivision.

A practitioner member noted that he does not turn over opening or closing slide presentations prior to using them in arguments. Also, during examination of a witness, he will often have an easel where he can write down highlights of the testimony as it is given. He asked whether these types of aids would be covered by the proposed rule. If these are considered illustrative aids, it is important to draft the rule in a way that does not discourage their use. Professor Capra acknowledged the validity of this concern, noted that these questions have been part of the Advisory Committee's discussions, and agreed that it would be important to ensure that the notice requirement would not be unduly rigid as applied to such situations. Judge Schiltz stated that the practitioner members on the Advisory Committee had expressed a similar concern, but the judge members favored requiring advance notice. Without advance notice, judges could have to deal with objections interpolated in the middle of an opening statement. In sum, Judge Schiltz

stated, this is a challenging issue, but the Advisory Committee is very focused on the pros and cons of the notice requirement.

Another practitioner member emphasized that trial practice has moved toward very slick presentations, for openings and closings, with expert witnesses, and even with fact witnesses. He stated that advance disclosure to opposing counsel can be a good idea; otherwise, if counsel shows the jury slides that mischaracterize the evidence, there is a real risk of a mistrial. The member said that judges often impose notice requirements for slides used in opening arguments, although they may be more flexible about closing arguments. Slides have become crucial in trial practice. Something might be lost by disclosing, he said, but disclosure avoids sharp practices. Judge Schiltz stated that he requires attorneys to provide advance disclosure, but the disclosure can be made five minutes beforehand. A judge member concurred; in her view, this is a case management issue on which it is difficult to write a rule. The judge has to know the case and require advance disclosures by the lawyers.

Professor Bartell noted the proposed rule text does not define “illustrative aid.” For example, if a lawyer stands 20 feet away from the witness and asks, “can you see my glasses,” one might say that is illustrative. She suggested being careful to cabin the rule’s scope.

Rule 1006 Summaries. Judge Schiltz introduced this information item as a companion proposal to the proposed amendment to Rule 611. Rule 1006 provides that certain summaries are admissible as evidence if the underlying records are admissible and if they are too voluminous to be conveniently examined at trial. This rule is often misapplied. Some judges erroneously instruct the jury that a summary admitted under Rule 1006 is not evidence. Some judges will not admit a Rule 1006 summary unless all the underlying records have been admitted into evidence, which runs contrary to the purpose of Rule 1006. Other judges do the opposite and will not allow Rule 1006 summaries if any of the underlying records have been admitted into evidence. The confusion over Rule 1006 is closely related to the confusion over illustrative aids, and the Advisory Committee hopes to clarify both topics.

Rule 611 – Safeguards to Apply When Jurors Are Allowed to Pose Questions to Witnesses. Judge Schiltz provided the update on this information item, explaining that the proposed amendment would list the safeguards that a court must use when it allows jurors to ask questions. The proposed rule would not take any position on whether jurors should be allowed to ask questions, but rather would provide a floor of safeguards that must apply if the judge does allow juror questions. These safeguards were taken from caselaw.

A judge member stated that it makes sense to have a rule regarding juror questions because it is an important and perilous area. He noted that there are various possible approaches to juror questions; one is to allow the lawyers to take the juror’s question under advisement and allow the lawyers to decide whether they will cover that topic in their own questioning of the witness. This seems like it might often be the prudent course, but proposed Rule 611(d)(3) appears to foreclose it. Professor Capra said he would look into this issue. His understanding was that judges that permit juror questions generally read the questions to the witness, and then allow for follow-up questioning from counsel.

Judge Bates asked whether proposed Rule 611(d)(1)(D) should be a bit broader. He suggested that instead of saying that no “negative inferences” should be drawn, it should say “no inferences” should be drawn. Professor Capra agreed that “negative” should be omitted. Following up on Judge Bates’s suggestion, a judge member added that it would be better to be even broader and suggested that Rule 611(d)(1)(D) say that no inference should be drawn from anything the judge does with a juror’s question (whether asking, not asking, or rephrasing it). Judge Bates stated his agreement with the judge member’s suggestion.

A judge member asked a question about Rule 611(d)(1). As she read the rule, it seems to prohibit juror questions outright unless the judge provides the required instructions “before any witnesses are called.” She asked how the rule would handle instances where the issue of juror questioning arises mid-trial; also, she wondered whether this timing requirement should be placed elsewhere in the rule. Professor Capra promised to take this issue into account.

Judge Schiltz referred the Standing Committee to the Advisory Committee’s report in the agenda book for information regarding the remainder of the information items, and there were no further comments.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY RULES

Judge Dennis Dow and Professors Gibson and Bartell provided the report of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, which last met via videoconference on September 14, 2021. The Advisory Committee presented one action item and three information items. The Advisory Committee’s report and the draft minutes of its last meeting were included in the agenda book beginning at page 157.

Action Item

Rule 7001. Judge Dow introduced this action item to request approval to publish for public comment an amendment to Rule 7001. The proposed amendment responds to Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion in her concurring opinion in *City of Chicago v. Fulton*, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), that the rulemakers “consider amendments to the Rules that ensure prompt resolution of debtors’ requests for turnover under § 542(a), especially where debtors’ vehicles are concerned,” because the delay in resolving turnover proceedings can present a problem for a debtor’s ability to recover the car that the debtor needs to get to work in order to earn money to fund a Chapter 13 plan. Before the Advisory Committee had a chance to address Justice Sotomayor’s comment, a group of law professors submitted a suggestion, which later was generally endorsed by another suggestion submitted by the National Bankruptcy Conference. The law professors recommended a new rule to allow all turnover proceedings to be brought by motion rather than adversary proceeding. The Advisory Committee decided on a narrower approach tailored to the issues raised by Justice Sotomayor and proposed amending Rule 7001 to provide that turnover of tangible personal property of an individual debtor could be sought by motion as opposed to adversary proceeding. The Advisory Committee decided not to adopt a national procedure for these turnover motions, preferring instead to allow them to remain governed by local rules.

An academic member stated that this rule will be a huge improvement over current procedure. He asked what would happen, under the proposal, in a Chapter 7 case when the trustee is seeking turnover of tangible property. The member expressed an expectation that the motion procedure would not apply to the trustee's turnover proceeding, because the proposal only extends to proceedings "by an individual debtor." Judge Dow agreed that under the proposed amendment, the trustee would need to seek turnover by adversary proceeding.

Upon motion, seconded by another, and on a voice vote: **The Standing Committee unanimously approved for publication for public comment the proposed amendment to Rule 7001.**

Information Items

Rule 9006(a)(6) (Legal Holidays). Judge Dow stated that the Advisory Committee has approved a technical amendment to Rule 9006(a)(6) adding Juneteenth National Independence Day to the list of legal holidays. The Advisory Committee is not asking for approval at this time; rather, it will make that request in June 2022 in coordination with the other Advisory Committees' parallel proposals.

Electronic Signatures. Judge Dow introduced this information item, which concerns electronic signatures by debtors and others who do not have a CM/ECF account. Judge Dow noted that this issue connects to the question of electronic filing by self-represented litigants, but he observed that the working group of reporters and FJC researchers is addressing the latter topic, so the Advisory Committee's focus in this information item was on the electronic-signature topic. The Advisory Committee is looking at the practice of requiring the debtor's counsel to retain a wet signature for documents signed by the debtor and filed electronically. Previously, when the Advisory Committee last considered amendments to Rule 5005(a) that would have allowed the filing of debtors' scanned signatures without the retention of the original "wet" signature, the DOJ raised concerns with technologies available for verifying those signatures. The Advisory Committee has asked the DOJ whether its concerns have been alleviated by intervening technical advances. The pandemic has given us some experience with courts relaxing the wet-signature-retention requirement, and the FJC is assisting the Advisory Committee in studying the issue. There is a preliminary draft of a possible amendment to Rule 5005(a) on page 161 of the agenda book.

Professor Gibson stated the Advisory Committee found this to be a challenging problem. With documents that are filed electronically, what constitutes a valid signature for purposes of the rules? Under all rule sets, a CM/ECF account holder's signature is associated with that holder's unique account. A filing made through the account holder's account, and authorized by that person, constitutes the person's signature. But that does not address the common situation in bankruptcy where the *attorney* is filing a document with the *debtor's* signature, as the debtor is not the account holder. (Also, a pro se litigant might be allowed by some courts to submit documents through some electronic means other than CM/ECF—for instance, via email.) The Advisory Committee is not sure where it stands with wet signature requirements, but it is continuing to explore. Professor Gibson also noted that the Advisory Committee needs to learn more about lawyers' views concerning the requirement that the attorney for a represented debtor retain a wet signature.

An academic member noted that the DOJ's concern the last time this issue came before the Advisory Committee was that without a requirement for the retention of a wet signature, the Department's experts in bankruptcy fraud prosecutions would not be able to verify the authenticity of a signature. He asked whether the possible change in approach now would flow from a change in what a handwriting expert was willing to testify to, or whether it would flow from the advent of electronic methods for verifying the signature. Professor Gibson answered that technology has improved since the last time the Advisory Committee addressed this issue, and now there are electronic-signing software programs that offer a means to trace electronic signatures back to the signer. DOJ has told the Advisory Committee that the proposal is no longer dead from the beginning, meaning there does not always have to be a wet signature for its experts to be able to verify the authenticity of the signature. But it depends on the technology. Software that enables verification of electronic signatures may not currently be incorporated into the software that consumer lawyers are using to prepare bankruptcy filings. The technology exists, however. Therefore, the Advisory Committee felt it is worth pursuing the amendment. Judge Dow noted that the Advisory Committee has included the DOJ in the discussions of this item from the outset and has stressed to the DOJ that its input is necessary.

Professor Coquillette applauded Professor Gibson's attention to state ethics requirements and cautioned that the Advisory Committee needs to be careful not to amend the rules in ways that could conflict with state-law professional-responsibility requirements. State-law professional-responsibility requirements may, for example, address the lawyer's retention of a client's "wet" signature.

Deputy Attorney General Monaco said she is hopeful that the Department can work through some of the technology issues that this proposal would raise. The Department has convened an internal working group to review the issue.

A judge member noted that he understands the point that the Advisory Committee does not want to have rules that require adoption of new software, but might the rules incentivize it? What if the rule says that if counsel use software that enables electronic signature verification, then they do not have to retain a wet signature? That could be a good development.

Restyling. Judge Dow introduced the final information item: an update on the restyling project. The project is going well. Parts I and II have gone through the entire process up to (but not including) transmission to the Judicial Conference, which will happen once the remaining parts have also passed through the entire process. Parts III through VI are out for public comment and are on track to go to the Standing Committee at the next meeting. Parts VII, VIII, and IX will come to the Advisory Committee this spring and should be ready for Standing Committee approval for publication this summer.

Professor Bartell added that while the restyling project has been ongoing, some of the restyled rules have been subsequently amended. The Advisory Committee still needs to decide how it wants to handle these amended rules. One possibility will be to request to republish for public comment all the restyled rules that have been subsequently amended.

Professor Kimble stated that the style consultants will conduct one final top-to-bottom review of all the restyled rules for consistency and any other minor issues. They are currently doing so for Parts I and II.

Judge Bates thanked the style consultants for their work on the restyling project.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES

Judge Robert Dow and Professors Cooper and Marcus provided the report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which last met via videoconference on October 5, 2021. The Advisory Committee presented one action item and three information items. The Advisory Committee briefly noted other items on its agenda, one of which elicited discussion. The Advisory Committee's report and the draft minutes of its last meeting were included in the agenda book beginning at page 184.

Action Item

Publication of Rule 12(a). Judge Dow introduced the only action item, a proposed amendment to Rule 12(a) that the Advisory Committee was requesting approval to publish for public comment. Rule 12(a) sets the time to serve responsive pleadings. Rule 12(a)(1) recognizes that a federal statute setting a different time should govern, but subdivisions 12(a)(2) and (3) do not recognize the possibility of conflicting statutes. However, there are in fact statutes that set times shorter than the time set by Rule 12(a)(2). While not every glitch in the rules requires a fix, this is one that would be an easy fix. The Advisory Committee decided unanimously to request publication for public comment.

Professor Cooper added there is an argument that Rule 12(a)(2) as currently drafted supersedes the statutes that set a shorter response time, and the Advisory Committee never intended such a supersession. In addition to fixing the glitch, the proposed amendment will avoid the potential awkwardness of arguments concerning unintended supersession.

Upon motion, seconded by a member, and on a voice vote: **The Standing Committee unanimously approved for publication for public comment the proposed amendment to Rule 12(a).**

Information Items

Multi-District Litigation (MDL) Subcommittee. Judge Dow introduced the work of the MDL Subcommittee as the first information item. Two major topics remain on the subcommittee's agenda. First, the subcommittee is looking at the idea of an "initial census" (what used to be known as "early vetting")—that is, methods for the MDL transferee judge to get a handle on the cases that are included in the MDL. There are three current MDLs where some version of this is in use—the *Juul MDL* before Judge Orrick in the Northern District of California, the *3M MDL* before Judge Rodgers in the Northern District of Florida, and the *Zantac MDL* before Judge Rosenberg (who chairs the MDL Subcommittee) in the Southern District of Florida. Second, the subcommittee is reviewing issues concerning the court's role in the appointment and compensation of leadership

counsel. Several meetings ago, the Advisory Committee discussed what it called a “high impact” sketch of a potential new Rule 23.3 that would extensively address court appointment of leadership counsel, establishment of a common benefit fund to compensate lead counsel, and court rulings on attorney fees. More recently, the subcommittee has been considering a sketch of a “lower impact” set of rules amendments that focuses on Rules 16(b) and 26(f). It would deal with both the initial census and issues of appointing, managing, and compensating leadership counsel throughout an MDL proceeding.

The approach taken in the lower impact sketch is similar to what the Advisory Committee did with Rule 23 a few years ago: operate at a high level of generality and not try to prescribe too much, but put prompts in the rules so that lawyers and judges know from day one a lot of the important things that they will encounter over the number of years it will take for an MDL to conclude. The subcommittee is trying to preserve flexibility. Much of what is in the rule sketch will not apply in any single given MDL. The prompts in the rule will guide MDL participants, and the committee note will provide more detail on how the court might apply these prompts. The subcommittee has met with Lawyers for Civil Justice and will meet with American Association for Justice and others in the coming months.

Professor Marcus observed, with respect to the call for rulemaking with respect to matters such as attorney compensation in MDLs, that rulemaking on such topics is challenging. One approach would be to amend Rule 26(f) so as to require the lawyers to address such matters in their proposed discovery plan; this could then inform the judge’s consideration of how to address those matters in the Rule 16(b) order. As to oversight of the settlement, Judge Dow noted that the subcommittee initially considered giving the judge oversight of the substance of the settlement, but now is focusing instead on whether to provide for judicial oversight of the process for arriving at the settlement. In current practice, some judges exert indirect influence on the settlement, for example through their orders appointing leadership counsel. But whether to make rules concerning settlement in MDLs is the most controversial issue the subcommittee is considering, and its members do not agree on how best to proceed. Professor Cooper added that the rules do not currently define what obligations, if any, leadership counsel has to plaintiffs other than their own clients.

Judge Bates said he agrees with the Civil Rules Committee report’s observation that the absence of any mention of MDLs in the Civil Rules is striking, given that MDLs make up a third or more of the federal civil caseload. He commended the Advisory Committee and subcommittee on their work on these issues.

A judge member suggested that the Advisory Committee consider addressing appointment of special masters. The role that courts have delegated to special masters in some large MDLs is significant. If the Advisory Committee addresses special masters, a rule could deal with whether and when special masters should have *ex parte* communications with counsel. There is the potential for an appearances problem if the special master is viewed as favoring one side or the other. A poor decision concerning the use of a special master can have significant consequences. Professor Marcus noted that Rule 53 requires that the order appointing a special master must address the circumstances, if any, in which the master may engage in *ex parte* communications.

However, the question then is whether Rule 53 is sufficient to address the issue in the MDL context.

A judge member thanked the subcommittee for its work on the MDL rules. He expressed skepticism concerning the desirability of rules specific to MDLs, noting that one size does not fit all as the cases range from quite simple to large and complicated. The current rules are flexible and capacious enough to accommodate the differences. Judge Chhabria's point (in the *Roundup MDL*) concerning the transferee judge's learning curve is well taken, but the judge member questioned whether a rule change could really make that learning curve any easier.

Apart from that big-picture skepticism, this judge member also made some more specific suggestions. First, the question of who should speak for the plaintiffs during the early meet-and-confer is a big one, and whether any rule should address that is a worthy issue that may warrant treatment if the Advisory Committee is going to be addressing MDLs. Second, in some MDLs the court has appointed lead counsel on the defense side, and the judge member queried whether the rules should address that. Third, if the rules will be amended to address table-setting issues that counsel and the court should consider early on, one such issue is whether there will be a master consolidated complaint and what its effect will be (a topic touched on in *Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 574 U.S. 405, 413 n.3 (2015)). Fourth, the judge member stressed that the common benefit fund order should be clear as to whether plaintiffs' lawyers will be required to submit to the common benefit fund a portion of their fees arising from the settlement of cases pending in other courts; he expressed doubt, however, as to whether the question of court authority to impose such a requirement is an appropriate topic for rulemaking. Lastly, the member noted that in the current rule sketch of proposed Rule 16(b)(5)(F) provided in the agenda book (at p. 197) it seemed a little odd to require the court in an initial order to provide a method for the court to give notice of its assessment of the fairness of the process that led to any proposed settlement.

A practitioner member stated that the judge member whose comments preceded hers had raised all the issues that she had in mind. She suggested that the Rule 16 approach is particularly well taken. It will cause more lawyers to read Rule 16 earlier and to pay attention to it. Rule 16 is "the Swiss Army knife" for active case management, and it is precisely the right context for adding provisions to deal with MDLs. Right now, judges are innovating in their MDL case-management orders, but that procedural common law is not as well disseminated as it should be amongst the people who need it the most: transferee judges and the lawyers practicing before them. If Rule 16 addresses MDL practice, judges will cite the rule in their orders, and in turn these orders will more likely be published and found in searches. Moreover, the proposed approach will not stifle the flexibility that exists in the absence of a rule. No two MDLs are the same. She noted that she wishes there were a repository of all MDL case-management orders. Getting MDLs into the rules in a very flexible way may confer at least some of that benefit.

Professor Coquillette seconded Professor Cooper's point concerning the significance of conflict-of-interest issues with lead counsel in MDLs. Questions percolate regarding American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule 1.7. The rulemakers should always be aware that attorney conduct is subject to another regulatory system, which applies broadly because most federal courts adopt by local rule either the ABA Model Rules or the rules of attorney conduct of the State in which they sit. Professor Marcus noted the added complication that the lawyers in an MDL may

be based in many different states. Professor Coquillette observed that the ABA Model Rules do have a choice-of-law provision, but it can be challenging to apply.

An academic member expressed his appreciation for the work of the subcommittee and reporters on this. He echoed the suggestion that, in this area, less is more. With the complexity and variation of MDLs, encasing things in formal rules is probably not a good idea. The goal should be to provide transparency and give some guidance to judges who do not have prior experience in MDLs. However, it would be a mistake to try to make something concrete when it should be plastic. Thus, the Manual for Complex Litigation seems to be the natural place to locate much of the guidance concerning best practices. This member also cautioned against trying to assimilate MDLs to Rule 23 class actions. Class action practice should not be the model for MDLs, because MDLs require flexibility.

Judge Bates acknowledged that the range of MDLs is daunting and that is a reason to question whether rules that apply to all MDLs can be formulated. However, that view is in tension with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves, which are a set of rules that apply to an even wider variety of cases.

A judge member echoed the comment on having a “best practices” guide outside the rules, and stated that the Advisory Committee should resist writing rules specific to MDLs.

Another judge member applauded the effort to continue to think about this important but difficult topic. The draft Rule 16(b)(5) is a little unusual in that it is a precatory statement about what a judge should consider, but it does not give the judge any additional tools that the judge does not already have. In this sense, the sketch of Rule 16(b)(5) resembles the Manual for Complex Litigation. This member suggested that, instead, the focus should be on whether there are tools that MDL transferee judges want but do not currently have, and whether those tools are something that an amendment under the Rules Enabling Act process can provide. Judge Dow observed that although a new edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation is in process, it will be several years before it comes out. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, likewise, has tried to provide guidance on best practices, but has held conferences only intermittently. He noted that the Standing Committee’s discussion overall evinced more support for the low-impact (Rule 16) approach than the high-impact (Rule 23.3) approach. Director Cooke reported that the FJC is in the preliminary stages of organizing a committee to assist in the preparation of a new edition of the Manual for Complex Litigation.

Discovery Subcommittee. Judge Dow briefly discussed the Discovery Subcommittee’s work on privilege log issues. Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers have very different views as to whether the current rules present problems. However, there are areas of consensus—that it could be valuable to encourage the parties to discuss privilege-log issues early on, perhaps with the

judge's guidance, and that a system of rolling privilege logs is useful. These areas are the subcommittee's current focus.

Judge Dow also noted the subcommittee's work on sealing. The AO is already reviewing issues related to sealing documents. The Advisory Committee is going to hold off on further consideration of sealing issues and will monitor the progress of the broader AO project.

Rule 9(b) Subcommittee. Judge Dow introduced the work of the new Rule 9(b) Subcommittee (chaired by Judge Lioi). The subcommittee is considering a proposal by Dean Benjamin Spencer to amend Rule 9(b)'s provision concerning pleading conditions of the mind (“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally”). The subcommittee has had its first meeting and will report to the Advisory Committee at its March meeting.

Other Items

Judge Dow briefly noted a multitude of other projects under consideration by the Advisory Committee, including proposals regarding Rules 41, 55, and 63, as well as one regarding amicus briefs in district courts and one involving the standards and procedures for granting petitions to proceed as a poor person (“in forma pauperis”). Judge Dow also noted that the Advisory Committee is awaiting public comments on the proposed new emergency rule, Rule 87.

Professor Cooper asked whether amicus practice in the district court may present very different questions from amicus practice in appellate courts. In addition to the relative rarity of amicus filings in the district court, he suggested there might be more of a risk that an amicus's participation could interfere with the parties' opportunity to shape the record and develop the issues germane to the litigation in the district court. The discussion during the Appellate Rules Committee's presentation left Professor Cooper concerned about drafting a Civil Rule to address amicus issues.

Judge Bates agreed that amicus filings in the district court could present different issues. He doubted whether there would be many instances where anything in an amicus brief could help to develop the record of the case. For example, in an administrative review case, the record is already set by what was before the administrative agency. And in most other civil cases, the factual record will be developed by the parties through discovery. On the other hand, amicus filings could help to frame or identify issues.

A judge member noted that he too was skeptical about addressing amicus filings in the Civil Rules. This seems to be a solution in search of a problem. If an organization wants to file an amicus brief, it requests leave to file the brief, and the judge decides whether to grant leave and how to handle ancillary issues such as affording the parties an opportunity to respond. Especially given that amicus filings in the district courts are relatively rare, why should the Civil Rules

address this topic when they do not address the general topic of briefs? The judge member also noted that having a rule regarding amicus briefs might encourage people to file more of them.

Judge Bates echoed the judge member's skepticism. Amicus briefs in district courts are almost all filed in just a few courts nationwide, including the District of Columbia (which has a local rule) and the Southern District of New York. This may be something where it is best to leave the practice to local rules in the few courts that see most of the amicus briefs.

Judge Dow stated that he agreed with the comments of the judge member and of Judge Bates. He noted that if a person has the resources to draft an amicus brief, it will have the resources to figure out how to request leave to file it.

A practitioner member stated that amicus briefs are being filed with increasing frequency in MDLs. This is not to say that there should be a Civil Rule on point, but it may be useful to keep in mind that the Appellate Rules' treatment of amicus briefs can be a useful resource for district judges. This member stated that amicus filings in the district court may sometimes attempt to contribute to the record by requesting judicial notice of particular matters; and amicus filings might sometimes add to the complexity in MDLs that are already complex enough. However, trying to craft a Civil Rule to address such issues may be borrowing trouble.

Professor Hartnett returned to the concern (that a member had raised during the discussion of the Appellate Rules Committee's report) that an amicus filing might be made in the district court with the goal of triggering the judge's recusal. Appellate Rule 29 allows the court of appeals to disallow or strike an amicus brief when that brief would require a judge's disqualification. Amicus filings designed to trigger recusal—if they became a common practice—would be more dangerous at the district court level when the case is before a single judge.

Another practitioner member stated that it would be a big mistake to have a national rule governing amicus briefs in district courts. Amicus briefs can be taken for what they are worth, and judges can either read them or not read them. To regulate this on a national basis just does not make sense.

Turning to matters covered in the Civil Rules Committee's written report, Judge Bates noted the Civil Rules Committee's decision not to proceed with a proposal to amend Rule 9 to set a pleading standard for certain claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. He requested that the Civil Rules Committee coordinate with the Rules Committee Staff at the AO to communicate this decision to Congress. The proposal in question, he noted, initially came from members of the Senate.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES

Judge Kethledge and Professors Beale and King presented the report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, which met in Washington, DC on November 4, 2021. The Advisory Committee presented several information items and no action items. The Advisory Committee's report and the draft minutes of its last meeting were included in the agenda book beginning at page 258.

Information Items

Grand Jury Secrecy Under Rule 6(e). Judge Kethledge described the Advisory Committee's decision not to proceed with a proposed amendment to Rule 6 regarding an exception to grand jury secrecy for materials of exceptional historical or public interest. The Advisory Committee had received multiple proposals for such an exception. Both the Rule 6 Subcommittee (chaired by Judge Michael Garcia) and the full Advisory Committee extensively considered the proposals. The subcommittee held an all-day miniconference where it heard a wide range of perspectives, including from former prosecutors, defense attorneys, the general counsel for the National Archives, a historian, Public Citizen Litigation Group, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. The subcommittee thereafter met by phone four times. It had two main tasks. First, it tried to draft the best proposed amendment. Second, it had to decide whether to recommend to the full Advisory Committee whether to proceed with a proposed amendment. The draft rule that the subcommittee worked out would have allowed disclosure only 40 years after a case was closed, and only if the grand jury materials had exceptional historical importance. However, a majority of the subcommittee decided not to recommend that the full Advisory Committee proceed with an amendment.

At its fall 2022 meeting, the Advisory Committee discussed the matter fully and voted 9-3 not to proceed with an amendment. Judge Kethledge noted that the Advisory Committee benefited from a wealth and broad range of relevant experience on the part of its members. The Advisory Committee understood the proposal's appeal and found it to present a close question. The members identified "back end" concerns – that is to say, possible risks that could arise at the time of the disclosure of the grand jury materials – and noted that those concerns could be addressed (although not fully avoided) by employing safeguards. However, Advisory Committee members were concerned that on the "front end" – that is, when a grand jury proceeding is contemplated or ongoing – the potential for later disclosure pursuant to the proposed exception would complicate conversations with witnesses and jeopardize the witnesses' cooperation. A number of members also noted that this exception would be different in kind from those that are currently in the rule. The other exceptions relate to the use of grand jury materials for other criminal prosecutions or national security interests. Historical interest would be an altogether different kind of exception. There was the sense that a historical significance exception would signal a relaxation of grand jury secrecy and could lead to unintended consequences. The grand jury is an ancient institution that advances its purposes in ways that we are often unaware of; this heightens the risk of unintended consequences from a rule amendment. The DOJ has consistently supported a historic significance exception, but all eight former federal prosecutors on the Advisory Committee opposed having an amendment along these lines. In sum, the Advisory Committee voted to not make an amendment, subject to input from the Standing Committee.

Judge Bates stated that he thought this was a carefully considered decision by the Advisory Committee.

A practitioner member expressed agreement with the recommendation not to proceed. This is a hard issue, and he recognizes the appeal of having an exception, but as a former federal prosecutor who is now on the other side of the bar, he does not feel comfortable having an

exception that only touches certain cases, namely those of exceptional historical interest, and therefore treats some grand jury participants differently than others.

A judge member praised the Advisory Committee's report for its thoroughness. This member asked how categorically the Advisory Committee had rejected the possibility of disclosures of very old materials of great public interest. Did the Advisory Committee believe that, had there been a grand jury investigation into the assassination of President Lincoln, disclosing those grand jury materials now would create "front end" problems with the cooperation of current-day witnesses? Judge Kethledge stated that it was the sense of the Advisory Committee that it should not add a new exception to Rule 6, even for material of great historical interest. One can think of examples where one would be glad for materials of such strong historical interest to be disclosed, but that does not mean that there should be a rule permitting such disclosure. As an analogy, take President Lincoln suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War. Many people would say they are glad that he did so because things may have turned out differently if he had not done so. Yet at the same time, most people would not want a general rule allowing the President to suspend habeas corpus when he sees fit.

Additionally, Judge Kethledge noted that although the Advisory Committee decided not to recommend a rule amendment, that does not exclude the possibility of common-law development of an exception. There is a circuit split as to whether federal courts have inherent authority to authorize disclosure of grand jury materials. Justice Breyer thought that the Advisory Committee should resolve the circuit split via rulemaking. However, Judge Kethledge stated his view, which he believed the Advisory Committee shares, that the underlying question of inherent authority was outside the purview of Rules Enabling Act rulemaking. If the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split in favor of recognizing inherent authority to authorize disclosure, the courts will be free to take a case-by-case approach.

Professor Beale added that a number of Advisory Committee members had noted that they felt comfortable with the state of the law prior to *McKeever v. Barr*, 920 F.3d 842 (D.C. Cir. 2019), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020), and *Pitch v. United States*, 953 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 624 (2020), and probably would have concluded (as the Advisory Committee had in 2012) that there was not a problem with courts very occasionally authorizing disclosure. Yet writing it out in a rule is fundamentally different: It would change the calculus and change the context under which the grand jury would operate going forward. It is unclear how changing that calculus and context would affect the grand jury as an institution.

A judge member said he thought that the Advisory Committee should consider a rule. He recalled from the Advisory Committee's discussions a shared sense that it is actually a good thing that grand jury materials have been released in certain cases of exceptional historical significance. The problem under the current regime is the circuit-to-circuit variation on whether disclosure is ever possible. Additionally, by not resolving the issue the Advisory Committee is just kicking the can down the road. If the Supreme Court rules that courts lack inherent authority to authorize disclosures not provided for in the Rule, then there will be renewed pressure for a rule amendment. If the Supreme Court instead rules that courts do have such inherent authority, there will still be demands for a rule amendment so as to provide a common approach to disclosure decisions. Therefore, either way, the rulemakers will end up having to take up this issue again.

The same member also stated he was less persuaded by the argument that an exception for materials of exceptional historical interest will dissuade witnesses from testifying. As it is, there are exceptions to grand jury secrecy, including—in some circuits—a multifactor test for whether to release grand-jury materials to the defendant once the defendant has been indicted. Thus, prosecutors already are unable to tell witnesses that there are no circumstances under which their testimony could become public. Furthermore, the comment that certain organizations, such as Al Qaeda or gangs, have long memories is a red herring: These are not the types of cases of exceptional historical interest that would fit within the contemplated exception. The member closed, however, by thanking the Advisory Committee for its thoughtful consideration of the issue.

Professor Hartnett advocated precision in the use of the phrase “inherent authority.” It can mean two different things: first, the court’s authority to act in the absence of authorization by a statute or rule; and second, the court’s authority to act despite a statute or rule that purports to prohibit it from acting. The latter type of inherent authority is much narrower and its scope presents a constitutional question. Judge Kethledge acknowledged this distinction, but noted that the question addressed by the Advisory Committee was only whether to adopt a provision of positive law, in the Criminal Rules, recognizing the exception in question.

Clarification of Court’s Authority to Release Redacted Versions of Grand Jury-Related Judicial Opinions. Judge Kethledge introduced this information item, which stems from a suggestion by Chief Judge Howell and former Chief Judge Lamberth of the District of Columbia District Court. The suggestion requested that Rule 6(e) be amended to clarify the court’s authority to issue opinions that discuss and potentially reveal matters before the grand jury. Both the subcommittee and entire Advisory Committee considered the issue. The Advisory Committee’s conclusion was that the issue is not yet ripe. There has not been any indication so far that redaction is inadequate as a means to avoid contentions that the release of a judicial opinion somehow violates Rule 6. Absent any recent contentions that the release of a judicial opinion violated Rule 6, the Advisory Committee did not think it should act on the suggestion at this time.

Rule 49.1 and CACM Guidance Referenced in the Committee Note. Judge Kethledge introduced this information item, which arises from a suggestion by Judge Furman. Judge Furman suggested amending Rule 49.1 and its committee note to clarify that courts cannot allow parties to file under seal documents to which the public has either a common law or First Amendment right of access. The Advisory Committee appointed a subcommittee to review the issue. Judge Kethledge noted that in his experience, there does seem to be a problem of parties filing documents under seal that should not be so filed.

Judge Furman clarified that the issue is more with the committee note than the text of the rule. The committee note specifies that a financial affidavit in connection with a request for representation under the Criminal Justice Act should be filed under seal. This is in tension with the approach of most courts, which have found that these affidavits are judicial documents and therefore subject to a public right of access under the Constitution. However, at least one court in reliance on the committee note has allowed defendants to file CJA-related financial affidavits under seal.

OTHER COMMITTEE BUSINESS

Legislative Report. The Rules Law Clerk delivered a legislative report. The chart in the agenda book at page 332 summarized most of the relevant information, but an additional bill had been introduced since the finalization of the agenda book. The AMICUS Act, which had been introduced in the previous Congress, was reintroduced in December, albeit with some differences compared to the previous version. As relevant to the Standing Committee, the new bill would apply to any potential amicus in the Courts of Appeals or Supreme Court, regardless of how many briefs it filed in a given year. The Rules Law Clerk also specifically noted the Protecting Our Democracy Act, which had passed the House in December 2021 and now awaits action in the Senate. That bill would prohibit any interpretation of Criminal Rule 6(e) that would prohibit disclosure to Congress of grand jury materials related to the prosecution of certain individuals that the President thereafter pardons. Additionally, the bill would direct the Judicial Conference to promulgate under the Rules Enabling Act rules to facilitate the expeditious handling of civil suits to enforce Congressional subpoenas.

Judiciary Strategic Planning. Judge Bates addressed the Judiciary Strategic Planning item, which appeared in the agenda book at page 339. The Judicial Conference has asked all its committees to provide any feedback on lessons learned over the past two years that may assist it in planning for future pandemics, natural disasters, and other crises that threaten to significantly impact the work of the courts.

Judge Bates asked the Standing Committee whether there was anything the members thought the Standing Committee should focus on in responding to the Judicial Conference. No members had any comments or questions regarding this item.

Judge Bates then asked the Standing Committee members whether there was any concern with delegating to him, Professor Struve, and the Rules Committee Staff the matter of communicating with the Judicial Conference. With no objections raised, Judge Bates said that he would consider that the approval of the Standing Committee.

Judicial Conference Committee Self-Evaluation Questionnaire. Every five years, the Judicial Conference requires all its committees to complete a self-evaluation. Judge Bates stated that he had circulated to the Standing Committee members a draft of that response.

The main item to address in the current draft is the modest adjustments to the jurisdictional statement for the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committees. First, the draft deletes the reference to receiving rule amendment suggestions “from bench and bar” because the Advisory Committees receive suggestions from others as well. Second, the draft clarifies that the Standing Committee, rather than the Advisory Committees, approves rules for publication for public comment. Third, the draft’s descriptions of the duties of the Standing Committee and Advisory Committees have been revised to reflect the discussion of those duties in the Judicial Conference’s procedures governing the rulemaking process.

Judge Bates asked the Standing Committee whether there were any comments regarding the draft response to the Judicial Conference’s committee self-evaluation questionnaire. There were none.

Judge Bates requested that the Standing Committee members delegate to him, Professor Struve, the Advisory Committee chairs, and the Rules Committee Staff the matter of responding to the self-evaluation questionnaire. Judge Bates noted that the Advisory Committee chairs had already weighed in on the draft response. With no objections raised, Judge Bates said that he would consider that the approval of the Standing Committee.

Update on Judiciary’s Response to COVID-19 Pandemic. Julie Wilson provided an update on the judiciary’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. She observed that the federal judge members of the Standing Committee had access to a number of resources on this topic via the “JNet” (the federal judiciary’s intranet website). There is a COVID-19 task force studying a wide range of items relevant to the judiciary’s response to the pandemic. Its current focus is on issues related to returning to the workplace. The task force has a virtual judiciary operations subgroup (“VJOS”) that includes representatives from the courts, federal defenders’ offices, and DOJ, and it is studying the use of technology for remote court operations. Ms. Wilson noted that she has highlighted for the VJOS participants the relevant Criminal Rules concerning remote versus in-person participation, and she predicted that suggestions on this topic are likely to reach the rulemakers in the future.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Before adjourning the meeting, Judge Bates thanked the Standing Committee members and other attendees for their patience and attention. The Standing Committee will next meet on June 7, 2022. Judge Bates expressed the hope that the meeting would take place in person in Washington, DC.